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BRAGGING RIGHTS RESTORED: THE THIRD CIRCUIT ALLOWS
ATTORNEYS TO QUOTE COMPLIMENTARY REMARKS FROM
JUDICIAL OPINIONS FOR ADVERTISING IN
DWYER v. CAPPELL
NICOLE HOLDEN*
“The [Third] Circuit’s opinion is highly persuasive and likely to gain
traction as a significant national precedent.”1
I. A QUICK PITCH: INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ADVERTISING
Picture the following television commercial: a lawyer sits at the stere-
otypical mahogany boardroom table in a courthouse as he ponders over
Law’s Empire,2 a classic philosophical book about the theory of law.3  Ap-
pearing to reach a revelation, he raises his right hand and is about to
speak.4  Suddenly, a rock song titled “I’m the One”5 by The Ugly Beats
begins to blare, and the scene cuts to the lawyer walking through a town,
still holding on to Law’s Empire.6  Along his journey, the lawyer quickly
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2013, The
Pennsylvania State University.  I would like to thank my family and friends,
especially William and Karen Holden for their love and encouragement
throughout my academic career and Theodore Edwards for his constant support.
I would also like to thank the editors of the Villanova Law Review for their helpful
guidance throughout the writing and editing process.
1. See David L. Hudson Jr., 3rd Circuit Ruling Upholds a Lawyer’s Right to Post
Glowing Judicial Comments About His Work, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.aba
journal.com/magazine/article/3rd_circuit_ruling_upholds_a_lawyers_right_to_
post_glowing_judicial_comment [http://perma.cc/S5WM-WU65] (quoting Rod-
ney A. Smolla, First Amendment Scholar, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see also id. (describing Dwyer’s reasoning as “spot-on from a
First Amendment perspective” (quoting Clay Calvert, Dir. Marion B. Brechner
First Amendment Project, Univ. of Fla.)(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
3. The following describes a commercial for Pete Reid Law, PLLC. See Pete
Reid Law, PLLC, Pete Reid Law – Austin Attorney – I’m the One for You, YOUTUBE (July
21, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GKau9iqBiU [https://perma.cc/
T5V7-XDTZ] [hereinafter Pete Reid, I’m the One for You] (portraying lawyer as
strong, smart, and honest).
4. See Joe Patrice, Everyone Needs to Watch This Insane and Awesome Lawyer Ad,
ABOVE L. (Aug. 1, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/08/everyone-
needs-to-watch-this-insane-and-awesome-lawyer-ad/ [http://perma.cc/NKM5-E3
DP] (describing opening scene as depiction of stereotypical lawyer, which then
escalates into unconventional image of lawyer).
5. THE UGLY BEATS, I’m the One, on BRING ON THE BEATS! (Get Hip Recordings
2004).
6. See Lawyer Advertises Himself as Best Ever Human Being, ROLLONFRIDAY (Aug.
8, 2014), http://www.rollonfriday.com/TheNews/EuropeNews/tabid/58/Id/34
65/fromTab/36/currentIndex/6/Default.aspx [http://perma.cc/K63E-49YE]
(noting lawyer “cut off by a blaring punk song” creating atypical lawyer image).
(727)
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solves a Rubik’s Cube, tosses a caber in an open field, breaks a wooden
board held by a martial arts instructor, and even scores an overhead-kick
goal in a game of soccer.7  Returning to the courthouse, the lawyer gives a
closing argument to the jury, walking back and forth with Law’s Empire
propped open in his hands.8  The music abruptly stops as the lawyer shuts
Law’s Empire.9  Then, the lawyer turns to the camera and says, “I rest my
case.”10  As the jury breaks into applause and gives the lawyer a standing
ovation, the words Pete Reid Law PLLC flash across the bottom of the
screen in giant, bold letters.11  If you saw this commercial, would you be
more inclined to hire Pete Reid for his legal services?12
7. See Alex Aldridge, Edinburgh Uni Law Graduate Cracks America with Hilarious
Ad for His New Firm, LEGAL CHEEK (Aug. 4, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.legalcheek.
com/2014/08/edinburgh-uni-law-graduate-cracks-america-with-hilarious-ad-for-his
-new-firm/ [http://perma.cc/EU6N-Q8Y4] (describing commercial as “YouTube
masterpiece”).  For the commercial depicting these events, see Pete Reid, I’m the
One for You, supra note 3.
8. See Dan Solomon, Until “Better Caul Saul” Debuts, Watch This Wacky Ad from a
Can-Do Austin Lawyer, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 27, 2014, 1:54 PM), http://www.fastco
create.com/3034857/until-better-caul-saul-debuts-watch-this-wacky-ad-from-a-can-
do-austin-lawyer [http://perma.cc/JV2U-HPMS] (highlighting unique and quirky
aspects of legal advertisement relaying message that Pete Reid has ideal qualities
public wants in lawyer).
9. See Travis Burchart, Are You Killing Your Blog Readers with Boredom? 4 Tips
That’ll Make You Anti-Boring, LEXTALK, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lextalk/getting-
ahead/f/7/t/1024.aspx [http://perma.cc/K253-BFZC] (last visited Oct. 27, 2015)
(providing tips to increase interest for legal blogs, and arguing Pete Reid’s com-
mercial is prime example of effective creativity).
10. See Attorney Raises Bar on Legal Ads, AUSTIN EGOTIST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://
www.theaustinegotist.com/news/local/2014/august/4/attorney-raises-bar-legal-
ads [http://perma.cc/A8TK-AVJ2] (commending Pete Reid for unique spin on
legal advertisement); see also Pete Reid, I’m the One for You, supra note 3, at 0:57.
11. See Emily Arata, Lawyer Shows Off Flying Kicks and Rescues a Drowning Man in
Epic Commercial, NOMINAL (Sept. 3, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.favorangels.com/
lawyer-shows-off-flying-kicks-and-rescues-a-drowning-man-in-epic-commercial/
[http://perma.cc/L995-VAFV] (calling Pete Reid’s commercial “an entirely unfor-
gettable ad”).
12. See Roman Mars, Call Now!, 99% INVISIBLE (Mar. 25, 2014), available at
http://99percentinvisible.org/episode/call-now/ [http://perma.cc/93LR-J9AJ]
(downloaded using iTunes) (discussing legal commercials and how some people
are “totally confused” by advertisements); see also Andrew Chow, How Not to Be a
Laughing Stock: 3 Dos and Don’ts for a Lawyer’s TV Ad, STRATEGIST BLOG (July 17,
2012, 5:01 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2012/07/how-not-to-be-a-
laughing-stock-3-dos-and-donts-for-a-lawyers-tv-ad.html [http://perma.cc/UZ56-
5URZ] (providing practical tips for lawyers seeking to increase clientele via televi-
sion commercials); Stacy West Clark, Marketing Activities That Will Pay Off the Most in
2015, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.thelegalintelligencer
.com/home/id=1202716147274?kw=Marketing%20Activities%20That%20Will%20
Pay%20Off%20the%20Most%20in%202015&et=editorial&bu=the%20Legal%20In
telligencer&cn=20150128&src=EMC-Email&pt=Recent%20Practice%20Columns&
slreturn=20150117110720 (advocating for practitioners to employ certain market-
ing techniques to increase revenue).
In 1977, the first television commercial for legal services aired as a “thirty-
second spot” for legal clinics. See John J. Watkins, Lawyer Advertising, the Electronic
Media, and the First Amendment, 49 ARK. L. REV. 739, 739 n.1 (1997) (describing
2
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Like Pete Reid, many lawyers today use creative advertising tactics as a
means to drum up business.13  Yet, even though the United States Su-
preme Court voided an absolute ban on lawyer advertising in Bates v. Ari-
zona,14 the American Bar Association (ABA) and state bar associations
continue to regulate legal advertising to preserve the public image of the
legal profession and protect against consumer deception.15  Conse-
quently, the legal profession struggles to implement legal advertising regu-
lations that do not violate lawyers’ First Amendment rights.16  When
lawyers challenge legal advertising rules, courts face the difficult task of
deciding which advertising techniques receive constitutional protection.17
Jacoby & Meyers commercial aimed at promoting affordable legal fees).  For exam-
ples of other unconventional advertising tactics, see Aaron J. Russ, Note, Is Groupon
for Lawyers Fraught with Ethical Danger? Why the Legal Community Should Embrace Inno-
vative Internet-Marketing for Lawyers, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 393, 418 (2013)
(crediting use of television commercials as traditional business tactic to generate
business); John Fisher, The Magic of Facebook Ads for Lawyers, LAW PRAC. ADVISOR
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.lawpracticeadvisor.com/magic-facebook/ [http://
perma.cc/9FDP-3854] (promoting use of Facebook to attract potential clients to
law firm’s fan page). But see Lee Rosen, 10 Quick Lawyer Advertising Tips, DIVORCE
DISCOURSE, https://divorcediscourse.com/10-quick-lawyer-advertising-tips/ [https:
//perma.cc/Z7TC-B3EW] (last visited Oct. 27, 2015) (warning lawyers that peers
may be critical of marketing efforts).
13. See, e.g., Jamie Casino, 2014 Jamie Casino – 2 Minute Super Bowl Commercial –
Casino’s Law, YOUTUBE (Feb. 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jr
2gdPY-88w [https://perma.cc/6M94-7KU3] (soliciting business for personal injury
victims); Karl Hafer, Jr., Tackiest Lawyer Commercial. . . Ever, YOUTUBE (Dec. 13,
2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y1Qk6QPzuIc [https://perma.cc/MD2
U-FNUQ] (advertising legal services to assist with divorce). But see Jordan Furlong,
The Problem with Lawyer Advertising, STEM LEGAL (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.stem
legal.com/strategyblog/2012/the-problem-with-lawyer-advertising/ [http://
perma.cc/279D-DE4U] (arguing lawyers are not effectively marketing themselves).
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
15. See Daniel M. Schaffzin, Warning: Lawyer Advertising May Be Hazardous to
Your Health! A Call to Fairly Balance Solicitation of Clients in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 8
CHARLESTON L. REV. 319, 353–56 (2014) (providing overview of ABA and state
rules regarding legal advertising); see also William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel,
Regulating Lawyer Advertising: Public Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 326 (1996) (explaining firm marketing is “an opportu-
nity to acquire information” for consumers).
16. See, e.g., Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
(analyzing challenge on Florida Bar rules regulating claims of “quality of service”
or “promise results” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Texans Against Censor-
ship, Inc. v. State Bar of Tex., 888 F. Supp. 1328, 1342 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (arguing
parts of State Bar of Texas are unconstitutional because they encompasses non-
commercial speech), aff’d, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996); Spencer v. Supreme Court
of Pa., 579 F. Supp. 880, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (analyzing whether Pennsylvania rule
prohibits “subjective characterization” of lawyers’ credentials and quality of ser-
vices), aff’d, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985).
17. See, e.g., Joan C. Rogers, Federal Suit Challenges Florida Bar Rules That Restrict
Statements in Websites, Blogs, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.
bna.com/federal-suit-challenges-n17179881059/ [http://perma.cc/R68V-TUK9]
(disputing constitutionality of Florida Bar rule requiring advertising to be “objec-
tively verifiable” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Recently, in Dwyer v. Cappell,18 the Third Circuit considered whether a
challenged New Jersey legal advertising guideline was unconstitutional.19
Applying a rigorous level of scrutiny to the regulation, the Third Circuit
held that the guideline infringed upon one lawyer’s free speech rights.20
The noteworthy decision in Dwyer is emblematic of the recent shift among
other federal courts of appeals, where courts are pushing against regula-
tors and deciding in favor of free speech.21
This Casebrief discusses how the Third Circuit’s decision in Dwyer
compromises the ability of state bar associations to regulate legal advertis-
ing.22  Part II provides a brief history of attorney advertising and discusses
a line of recent federal appellate court decisions that invalidate legal ad-
vertising regulations.23  Part III examines the Third Circuit’s decision in
Dwyer.24  Part IV translates the Third Circuit’s Dwyer analysis into practical
guidance for Third Circuit practitioners.25  Finally, Part V concludes by
discussing the Dwyer decision within the larger context of the attorney ad-
vertising debate.26
II. CREATING A PLATFORM: PAST AND PRESENT LEGAL ADVERTISING IN THE
UNITED STATES
The legal profession has experienced a drastic shift in attorney adver-
tising regulation.27  Less than forty years ago, bar associations prohibited
18. 762 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2014).
19. See id. at 279 (discussing nature of plaintiff’s allegations).
20. See id. at 282, 284 (holding New Jersey rule unconstitutional); see also Cat
DeHart, Recent Ethics Opinions of Significance, 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 117, 119–20 (2014)
(providing brief overview of Third Circuit’s holding).
21. See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 20–21, Dwyer v. Cappell 762 F.3d 275 (3d
Cir. 2014) (No. 13-3235), 2013 WL 6054581, at *20–21 (highlighting courts in sim-
ilar contexts also reject argument that advertisement is inherently misleading); see
also Hudson, supra note 1 (“Courts are increasingly skeptical of the invocation by
regulators of phrases such as ‘inherently misleading’ or ‘self-evidently mislead-
ing.’” (quoting Rodney A. Smolla, First Amendment Scholar, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of
Law) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. For an analysis on Dwyer’s effect on legal advertising regulations, see infra
notes 87–160 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the development of legal advertising regulations, see
infra notes 27–86 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion on the Third Circuit’s holding and reasoning, see infra
notes 87–122 and accompanying text.
25. For an examination on Dwyer’s impact on Third Circuit practitioners, see
infra notes 123–54 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the implications of Dwyer on future legal advertising
regulations, see infra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
27. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee
Cost Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641–60 (2013) (tracing history of legal advertis-
ing in United States from 1970s to 1990s); Ransom Riggs, Should Lawyers Be Allowed
to Advertise?, MENTAL_FLOSS (Sept. 19, 2007, 5:40 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/
article/16991/should-lawyers-be-allowed-advertise [http://perma.cc/95EL-QJA9]
(contrasting bar associations’ initial prohibition on advertising with examples of
current legal advertising); see also MARKETING FOR ATTORNEYS AND LAW FIRMS xvii
4
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nearly all forms of legal advertising.28  In 1977, the Supreme Court lifted
the ban on legal advertising in Bates.29  Still, the Supreme Court stated
that the right to advertise is not unlimited and the Court created two tests
for commercial speech regulations.30  Recent circuit court decisions, how-
ever, indicate a preference towards limiting the reach of legal advertising
regulations by rigorously applying these two tests.31
A. The Initial Slogan: No Legal Advertising
For most of the nineteenth century, the legal community refrained
from advertising its services because it prided itself as an “elite” practice
and saw advertising as a threat to its respectable reputation.32  Moreover,
lawyers viewed their work as a public service.33  As a result, the profession
“believed itself to be free from the market forces that affected other busi-
(William J. Winston ed., Routledge 1993) (commenting on shift in views on legal
advertising and how lawyers today are motivated to utilize new marketing
techniques).
28. For a discussion on the initial prohibition of legal advertising, see infra
notes 32–40 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion on the Bates decision, see infra notes 41–46 and accompa-
nying text.
30. For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s tests for commercial speech reg-
ulations, see infra notes 47–65 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of the Eleventh, Fifth, and Second Circuits’ approaches
to legal advertising regulation challenges, see infra notes 66–86 and accompanying
text.
32. See Daniel Callender, Comment, Attorney Advertising and the Use of Dramati-
zation in Television Advertisements, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 89, 92 (2001) (noting how
lawyers have traditionally refrained from advertising their services); see also Morti-
mer A. Rosecan, Dean, Address at International Academy of Trial Lawyers Annual
Meeting: Lawyer Advertising and Specialty Certification (1985), transcript available
at http://www.iatl.net/files/public/85_lawyer_i4a.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TW3-
4UQZ] (stating ABA’s ban on advertising originates from Inns of Court in
London).
The traditional ban on legal advertising originated in England. See HENRY S.
DRINKER, WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL FOUND., LEGAL ETHICS 210 (3d prtg. 1961)
(providing historical backdrop on American legal advertising views).  In England,
barristers came from wealthy, established families; they considered law to be a so-
phisticated, prestigious profession and regarded their work as a public service. See
id. (explaining the socioeconomic makeup of traditional lawyers in England).  The
barristers viewed their profession with “a certain traditional dignity” that created
an intimate community, resulting in a disdain of advertising the legal services they
provided. See id.  The young barristers carried this perception into the late eight-
eenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century and eventually “became
the leaders of the American bar.” See id.
33. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal Profession and
Its Reform, 68 TEX. L. REV. 451, 451–52 (1989) (book review) (recounting how past
legal professionals viewed public service as central ideal and how spirit of public
service is most essential characteristic in legal profession); see also ANTHONY D. CAS-
TELLI, ATTORNEY ADVERTISING REVEALED: HOW TO GET THROUGH THE HYPE AND
HIRE A GREAT PERSONAL INJURY LAWYER 8, 15 (2011), available at http://www.castel
lilaw.com/sites/www.castellilaw.com/files/castelli_ebook_0.pdf [http://perma
.cc/GT9T-8D53] (arguing some lawyers believed that through advertising, legal
“profession would, in plain and simple words, not be so highfalutin’”).
5
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nesses and industries.”34  Beginning around the mid-1800s, however, views
of the legal profession shifted from a vocation to a profitable market that
created a desire for legal advertising.35
Many viewed this movement as a danger to legal ethics.36  In reaction,
the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the first national code on
legal ethics in 1908—the Canon of Ethics.37  Reaffirming traditional views,
Canon 27 forbade lawyers from advertising and deemed the practice un-
professional.38  The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)
Today, some practitioners still view advertising as an unfavorable practice that
contributes to a negative reputation among the American public. See William G.
Hyland Jr., Attorney Advertising and the Decline of the Legal Profession, 35 J. LEGAL PROF.
339, 344–45 (2011) (attributing public’s low opinion of legal community as result
of advertising).
34. See Lauren Dobrowalski, Comment, Maintaining the Dignity of the Profession:
An International Perspective on Legal Advertising and Solicitation, 12 DICK. J. INT’L L.
367, 375 (1994) (discussing traditional legal advertising views in Great Britain).
For a further discussion on law as a vocation, see generally Timothy W. Floyd, The
Practice of Law as a Vocation or Calling, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1405 (1998) (advocating
for lawyers to embody certain virtues in order to improve character of legal
profession).
35. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Mul-
tiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 756 (1992) (ex-
ploring shift of legal community from being purely advocacy-oriented in late 1800s
to early 1900s). But see Eugene R. Gaetke, Lessons in Legal Ethics from Reading About
the Life of Lincoln, 97 KY. L.J. 583, 592 n.79 (2009) (stating Chief Justice Warren
Burger viewed advertising as contributing factor to decline of legal profession).
36. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2403–04 (2003) (discussing President Roosevelt’s distaste
for legal shift away from focusing on individual client to focusing on elite corpora-
tions); see also Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1,
5–7 (1993) (encouraging increase in regulation of legal advertising to avoid “huck-
ster-shyster” advertisements).  On June 28, 1905, President Roosevelt criticized the
legal profession for its lack of ethics during his commencement address at Harvard
University, which sparked a debate about legal ethics, particularly with the ABA.
See Theodore Roosevelt, Address at Harvard Commencement: The Harvard Spirit
(June 28, 1905), in 14 HARV. GRADUATES MAG. 7, 8 (1905) (providing transcript of
address).
37. Altman, supra note 36, at 2395 (identifying Canon of Ethics as “first national
code of legal ethics in [United States]”); see also id. at 2409 (“[T]he Canons Project
grew out of President Theodore Roosevelt’s progressive critique of corporation
lawyers and the spirit of commercialism pervading legal practice.”); Robert D.
Peltz, Legal Advertising—Opening Pandora’s Box?, 19 STETSON L. REV. 43, 46 (1989)
(arguing that current restrictions on legal advertising date back to enactment of
Canon 27).
38. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (1908).  According to Canon 27,
“[t]he most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited repu-
tation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.” Id.  Canon 27 emphasized
that lawyers should only acquire new business by fostering intimate relationships
with others. See id.  Once that relationship was established, a lawyer could then
provide someone a personal business card. See id. (explaining acceptable methods
of advertising).  Yet, “[t]his cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of charac-
ter and conduct.” Id.  Canon 27 explained that “advertisement[s] for business by
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning causes in which the law-
6
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superseded the Canon of Ethics in 1969 and expressly prohibited legal ad-
vertising.39  Because almost all states adopted the Model Code, states
could legally prohibit attorneys from advertising—a prohibition that the
Supreme Court would analyze soon thereafter.40
B. Launching a New Campaign: Bates v. Arizona Lifts the Ban on Legal
Advertising
By the 1970s, members of the legal community came to reject the idea
that lawyers should be banned from advertising, reasoning that legal ad-
vertisements served as a vital means of educating the American public on
the availability of legal services.41  Consequently, in 1977, lawyers chal-
lenged this restriction on advertising in Bates, where the Supreme Court
held a blanket ban on attorney advertising was unconstitutional.42
In Bates, the Arizona State Supreme Court imposed a disciplinary rule
that prohibited lawyers from advertising.43  Two attorneys challenged this
yer has been or is engaged . . . and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions
and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.” Id.
39. See CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1969) (preliminary
draft) (“A lawyer shall not publicize himself, his partner, or associate as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announce-
ments, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize others to do so on his behalf.” (foot-
note omitted)).  The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was created by the ABA
to correct certain perceived inadequacies of the Canons. See ABA SPECIAL COMM.
ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L ETHICS, Preface to PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, at v (1969).
In 1983, the ABA created new guidelines for legal professionalism, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and
Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47
GONZ. L. REV. 99, 135–37 (2011) (tracing history of professional conduct rules
promulgated by ABA).  Currently, all states except California have adopted some
version of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See ABA COMM. on CPR
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, STATE ADOPTION OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT AND COMMENTS (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7Y6G-3PKP] (listing states that adopted ABA Model Rules).
40. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702, 702 (1977) (highlighting that ABA’s Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility created “battle in the courts” over legal advertising restrictions).
41. See Callender, supra note 32, at 94–95 (arguing middle class not hiring
lawyers due to deficiency in information available to public on legal services). But
see Anne Bond Emrich, Legal Profession Is Low on Public Confidence Scale, GRAND
RAPIDS BUS. J. (May 3, 2002), http://www.grbj.com/articles/59976 [http://
perma.cc/LP2A-XGM2] (reporting that lawyers contribute to low public confi-
dence through advertising).
42. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977); see also Eli Wald,
Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Between Confidentiality Require-
ments and Contemporary Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 256–57 (2007)
(explaining how Supreme Court rejected claims that advertising would lead to
commercialization of legal industry).
43. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 355 (summarizing rule at issue); Monica R. Richey,
Commentary, Modern Trends of Restrictions on Lawyer Solicitation Laws, 29 J. LEGAL
7
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rule after they were suspended from practice for advertising their services
in a local newspaper.44  In finding a blanket ban on legal advertising un-
constitutional, the Supreme Court “was careful to limit its opinion by stat-
ing that certain attorney advertising could be regulated.”45  While the
legacy of Bates prohibits a state from implementing a complete ban on
legal advertising, the Court explained that there are “clearly permissible
limitations on advertising not foreclosed by our holding.”46
C. Developing a Strategy: The Supreme Court Adopts Two Tests for Commercial
Speech Regulations
As the Supreme Court addressed various commercial speech issues, it
developed two distinct tests for assessing whether a limitation is constitu-
tionally permissible.47  For restriction regulations, the Supreme Court set
forth the four-prong Central Hudson test.48  For disclosure requirement
regulations, the Court alternatively created the Zauderer test.49  In creating
these separate tests, the Supreme Court applies a lower standard of review
to disclosure requirements, allowing them to pass constitutional muster
with more ease than restriction regulations.50
PROF. 281, 284 (2005) (same); see also Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” as Pathology:
The ABA’s Latest Policy Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 75, 101 (2012) (explaining why Supreme Court rejected Arizona
Bar’s basis for ban).
44. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANG-
ING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 284 (8th ed. 2013) (emphasizing
“risky” nature of John Bates and Van O’Steen’s advertisement in Arizona newspa-
per); David L. Hudson Jr., Bates Participants Reflect on Landmark Case, FIRST AMEND-
MENT CTR. (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/bates-partici
pants-reflect-on-landmark-case [http://perma.cc/KQ3A-5Q6J] (stating Bates and
O’Steen placed advertisement in the Arizona Republic on February 22, 1976 and
describing subsequent events).
45. Kyle Lawrence Perkins, Comment, Attorney Advertising: The Marketing of Le-
gal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 103 (2000) (explaining
how Supreme Court acknowledged that legal advertising can still be subject to
some regulations); see also Mars, supra note 12 (explaining Florida has restrictions
for advertising).
46. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (stating legal advertising protection is not
boundless).
47. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 217–21 (2011) (distinguishing tests for restrictions and
disclosures); Jonathan H. Adler, What Are the Constitutional Limits on Compelled Com-
mercial Speech?, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/07/what-are-the-constitutional-limits-on-compel
led-commercial-speech/ [http://perma.cc/SAG2-QTVE] (asserting both tests
originate from same doctrine).
48. For a discussion of the four-prong test for disclosure requirements, see
infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
49. For a discussion on the test for disclosure requirements, see infra notes
57–62 and accompanying text.
50. For a discussion on the different levels of scrutiny for regulations relating
to commercial speech and disclosures, see infra notes 63–65 and accompanying
text.
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1. Restriction Regulations
In 1980, the Supreme Court created the test for commercial speech
restrictions in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Services Commis-
sion,51 articulating a four-prong approach to determine the constitutional-
ity of commercial speech restrictions now known as the Central Hudson
test.52  First, the court must determine whether the speech at issue is pro-
tected, meaning it is both lawful and not misleading.53  Second, if the
speech is protected, the court must then determine whether the govern-
ment asserts a substantial interest for the restriction.54  Third, the restric-
tion must advance this governmental interest.55  Fourth, the restriction
cannot be more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s
interest.56
51. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray:
Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for
Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1635–41 (1997) (providing over-
view of cases following Central Hudson that applied four-prong analysis to commer-
cial speech regulations); see also United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164 (2d
Cir. 2012) (applying Central Hudson analysis to rule prohibiting “off-label promo-
tion” of pharmaceuticals); Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th
Cir. 2010) (applying Central Hudson to Nevada rule that limits “commodification of
sex” in advertising); El Dı´a, Inc. v. P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110,
115–18 (1st Cir. 2005) (analyzing government restriction regulation under Central
Hudson test).
52. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 566 (creating new test to assess com-
mercial speech restrictions).
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.  At
the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both in-
quiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
53. See id. at 567 (acknowledging that utility advertisement is accurate and
does not relate to any unlawful activity, thereby falling under commercial speech
protection); see also Stephen M. Worth, Article, “Do Not Call” Laws and the First
Amendment: Testing the Limits of Commercial Free Speech Protection, 7 J. SMALL & EMERG-
ING BUS. L. 467, 482 (2003) (explaining first prong of Central Hudson through anal-
ysis of telemarking regulations).
54. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569–70 (finding that promotion of energy
conservation is substantial state interest); see also David L. Williamson, The Central
Hudson Four Part Test, SIGN & DIGITAL GRAPHICS (Dec. 3, 2009), http://sdgmag.
com/article/business-marketing/central-hudson-four-part-test [http://perma.cc/
4FN9-QC9E] (discussing burden on government to demonstrate substantial inter-
est for restriction regulation).
55. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570 (finding interest of conserving energy
not justified by ban on advertisements); see also Andrew S. Gollin, Comment, Im-
proving the Odds of the Central Hudson Balancing Test: Restricting Commercial Speech as
a Last Resort, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 873, 890 (1998) (discussing ways courts have
strengthened application of third prong).
56. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(concluding law fails fourth prong because law was more extensive than necessary
9
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2. Disclosure Requirements
Five years after the Central Hudson test for restriction regulations was
announced, the Supreme Court evaluated another commercial speech
regulation, this time regarding a factual disclosure requirement.57  In
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,58 an attorney advertised that any
client who lost at trial would not owe legal fees, but the attorney neglected
to disclose that even losing clients would still owe court costs.59  Address-
ing whether a state can require attorneys to disclose this additional ex-
pense, the Supreme Court upheld the disclosure requirement and set
forth a new test.60  Adopting a more deferential standard than the Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny test, the Court stated that disclosure require-
ments are constitutionally permissible “as long as [they are] reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers” and
the disclosure requirements are not “unduly burdensome.”61  Addition-
to serve government interest). But see Kayla R. Burns, Note, Reducing the Inherent
Malleability of Mid-Level Scrutiny in Commercial Speech: A Proposed Change to the Second,
Third, and Fourth Prongs of the Central Hudson Test, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1579, 1596
(2011) (asserting fourth prong fails to remedy courts’ disproval of paternalistic
regulations).
57. See Cory L. Andrews, Graphic Tobacco Warning Case Can Present SCOTUS
Opportunity on Commercial Speech Doctrine, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2012/09/14/graphic-tobacco-warning-case-can-present-
scotus-opportunity-on-commercial-speech-doctrine/ [http://perma.cc/SG5C-AR
ZE] (explaining how Supreme Court applies “relaxed” test for disclosures instead
of rigorous Central Hudson test).
58. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
59. See id. at 633 (describing nature of rule at issue).  Currently, circuits differ
on whether Zauderer is limited to disclosure requirements aimed at consumer pro-
tection disclosure or if Zauderer extends beyond consumer protection. See Thomas
C. Means, To Label or Not to Label? Companies May Have No Choice, LAW 360 (Sept. 30,
2014, 10:32 AM), https://www.crowell.com/files/To-Label-Or-Not-To-Label-Com
panies-May-Have%20No-Choice.pdf [http://perma.cc/474P-UJZW] (discussing
recent D.C. decision that expanded Zauderer).
60. Compare Dorothy Virginia Kibler, Note, Commercial Speech and Disciplinary
Rules Preventing Attorney Advertising and Solicitation: Consumer Loses with the Zauderer
Decision, 65 N.C. L. REV. 170, 184 (1986) (“The Supreme Court in Zauderer for the
first time directly addressed the constitutionality of compelled speech as part of a
state’s regulation of commercial speech, and held that compelled speech regula-
tions need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.”), with
Cory Andrews, Second Circuit Overturns Law that Compelled Businesses to Advertise Their
Competitors’ Services, WLF LEGAL PULSE (Sept. 23, 2014), http://wlflegalpulse.com/
2014/09/23/second-circuit-overturns-law-that-compelled-businesses-to-advertise-
their-competitors-services/ [http://perma.cc/W6BJ-HUNS] (“Nowhere in
Zauderer does the Court refer to the scrutiny it was applying as ‘rational review,’
and it clearly stated that the government must be advancing a substantial interest
even if the mandated speech was ‘purely factual and uncontroversial.’”).
61. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see The Supreme Court, 1984 Term—Leading Cases,
99 HARV. L. REV. 193, 201 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting Su-
preme Court’s holding asserts unduly burdensome requirements can violate con-
stitutional rights); see also Josh King, Disclaimer Requirements, SOCIALLY AWKWARD,
http://sociallyawkwardlaw.com/attorney-advertising-regulation/disclaimers/
10
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ally, the Supreme Court noted that because the deception in Zauderer was
self-evident, the state was not required to produce supportive evidence.62
3. Implications of Zauderer and Central Hudson for Legal
Advertising Regulations
By creating two separate tests dependent on the type of commercial
speech regulation, the Supreme Court deliberately subjects disclosure re-
quirements to Zauderer’s lower standard of review.63  Unlike an outright
prohibition on speech imposed by a restriction regulation, the Supreme
Court explained “the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure
requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is
actually suppressed . . . .”64  Accordingly, lower courts have traditionally
upheld legal advertising disclosure requirements under Zauderer, equating
[http://perma.cc/7WHA-QR3C] (last visited Oct. 27, 2015) (arguing that courts
do not correctly apply Zauderer test).
62. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652–53 (“When the possibility of deception is as
self-evident . . . we need not require the State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public
before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.’”
(second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1965))); see also Kristen A. Hosack, Note, Holy
Smokes! Can the Government Compel Tobacco Companies to Engage in Inflammatory Com-
mercial Speech?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 896 (2014) (“In deciding whether a state
has an interest in preventing consumer deception, the Supreme Court analyzes
whether the commercial speech’s potential for deceit is self-evident.”).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a lack of evidence
showing how the regulation prevents consumer deception is not fatal, explaining
that states can show this prevention of deception by “history, consensus, and sim-
ple common sense” or the state interest can be “self-evident.” See Milavetz, Gallop
& Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250–51 (2010) (emphasizing that
states can regulate “inherently misleading advertising, particularly through disclo-
sure requirements”); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (stating
restrictions can be upheld by “history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense’”
(quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992))); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S.
191, 202 (1982) (“[T]he Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent cases that
regulation—and imposition of discipline—are permissible where the particular ad-
vertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particu-
lar form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.”).
63. See Bianca Nunes, Case Note, The Future of Government-Mandated Health
Warnings After R.J. Reynolds and American Meat Institute, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ON-
LINE 177, 183 (2014) (explaining that Supreme Court “declined to extend Central
Hudson[’s]” intermediate scrutiny to disclosure requirements and instead applied
rational basis); Cydney Posner, En Banc Opinion of D.C. Circuit Upholds American
Meat Institute Case — What Does It Mean for the Conflict Minerals Case?, PUBCO @
COOLEY (July 29, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://cooleypubco.com/2014/07/29/en-banc-
opinion-of-d-c-circuit-upholds-american-meat-institute-case-what-does-it-mean-for-
the-conflict-minerals-case/ [http://perma.cc/9NAD-MRGY] (stating Supreme
Court’s intent was “to establish a lower standard of scrutiny” for disclosures).
64. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14 (providing rationale for lower standard of
review); Julie C. LaVille, Note, A Warning Worth a Thousand Words: First Amendment
Challenges to the FDA’s Graphic Warning Label Requirements, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 243,
262–63 (2013) (discussing Zauderer rational basis review in context of graphic
images in tobacco warning labels).
11
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the test to a rational basis analysis, but have remained skeptical of legal
advertising restriction regulations under Central Hudson.65
D. A New Trend in Legal Advertising: Recent Circuit Court Rulings
Invalidating Advertising Regulations
Although the Supreme Court adopted two separate tests for commer-
cial speech regulations based on the content regulated, the federal courts
of appeals have inconsistently applied Central Hudson and Zauderer.66
Some circuits apply Central Hudson to disclosure requirements when they
should apply Zauderer.67  Additionally, some circuits applying Zauderer re-
quire concrete evidence that the advertisement is misleading, despite the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the misleading nature of an advertise-
ment can be self-evident.68
1. Improper Application of the Central Hudson Test
In Mason v. Florida Bar,69 the Eleventh Circuit held unconstitutional a
Florida Bar Association disclosure regulation prohibiting an attorney from
including the phrase “‘AV Rated,’ the Highest Rating Martindale-Hubbell
National Law Directory.”70  Though truthful, the statement violated a Flor-
65. See, e.g., Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 264 (2d Cir. 2014)
(rejecting Zauderer rational basis and applying Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny
because disclosure requirement was not geared towards “company’s own products
or services,” instead requiring company to disclose competitor’s name); Pharm.
Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (concluding Zauderer’s
test is “so obviously met” in case under rational basis review); see also Leonard
Gordon, First Amendment Challenge Grounded, VENABLE LLP (Aug. 1, 2012), http://
www.allaboutadvertisinglaw.com/2012/08/first-amendment-challenge-grounded-
1.html [http://perma.cc/8GU9-EJR6] (discussing different standards of review for
First Amendment challenges).
66. See R. Michael Hoefges, Regulating Professional Services Advertising: Current
Constitutional Parameters and Issues Under the First Amendment Commercial Speech Doc-
trine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 953, 1010–11 (2007) (commenting on how
some circuit courts seem to blend Zauderer test and Central Hudson test); Dayna B.
Royal, The Skinny on the Federal Menu-Labeling Law & Why It Should Survive a First
Amendment Challenge, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 140, 166 n.151 (2011) (“[T]hough
the Eleventh Circuit also cites Zauderer, it appears to think Central Hudson is the
proper test where a disclosure is at issue because the court finds that the
mandatory disclosure violates Central Hudson.”). Compare Hayes v. Zakia, No. 01-
CV-0907E(SR), 2002 WL 31207463, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) (deciding to
apply Central Hudson test to disclosure requirement regulation), with  Tillman v.
Miller, No. 1:95-CV-1594-CC, 1996 WL 767477, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1996)
(applying Zauderer test to disclosure requirement regulation), aff’d, 133 F.3d 1402
(11th Cir. 1998).
67. For a discussion on the misapplication of Central Hudson in the Eleventh
and Second Circuits, see infra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
68. For a discussion on the recent shift towards requiring concrete evidence
under Zauderer, see infra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
69. 208 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2000).
70. See id. at 954 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining Florida Bar
rule prohibiting self-laudatory statements).
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/3
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR403.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-NOV-15 14:56
2015] CASEBRIEF 739
ida Bar Association rule requiring the attorney to add a disclaimer to ex-
plain the AV rating system.71  Without referencing the Zauderer test for
disclaimer regulations, the Eleventh Circuit applied Central Hudson.72  Fo-
cusing on Central Hudson’s third prong, which requires that the restriction
“target an identifiable harm and . . . mitigate against such harm in a direct
and effective manner,” the court concluded that the Florida Bar Associa-
tion could not meet this burden because it did not present any “concrete
evidence” that the attorney’s advertisement was misleading.73  Further-
more, the court rejected the Florida Bar Association’s argument that it was
“simple common sense” that the attorney’s advertisement was misleading,
commenting, “the Supreme Court has not accepted ‘common sense’
alone to prove the existence of a concrete, non-speculative harm.”74
Similarly, in Hayes v. New York Attorney Grievance,75 the Second Circuit
struck down provisions in New York’s legal advertising rules about disclo-
sure requirements for legal specializations.76  Like the Eleventh Circuit,
The Florida Bar created Rule 4-7.2(j), which stated that “[a] lawyer shall not
make statements that are merely self-laudatory or statements describing or charac-
terizing the quality of the lawyer’s services in advertisements and written communi-
cation . . . .” Id. (second alteration in original).  In this case, the plaintiff, Steven
G. Mason, violated Rule 4-7.2(j) by including that he was “‘AV’ Rated, the Highest
Rating Martindale-Hubbell National Law Directory” in a yellow pages advertise-
ment. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Florida Bar informed Ma-
son that he must provide a “full explanation as to the meaning of the [Martindale-
Hubbell] AV rating and how the publication chooses the participating attorneys.”
See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See id. at 954–55 (explaining Florida Bar believed Mason’s advertisement
“would mislead the unsophisticated public”); see also David L. Hudson Jr., Firm
Challenges Florida Bar over Website Ad Limits, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.aba
journal.com/magazine/article/firm_challenges_florida_bar_over_website_
ad_limits [http://perma.cc/45G6-BU2L] (explaining Mason challenged “Florida
Bar over a Yellow Pages ad”).
72. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641–42 (6th Cir. 2010)
(noting that Eleventh Circuit failed to explain why it used Central Hudson test in-
stead of Zauderer test).
73. See Farrin v. Thigpen, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438 (M.D.N.C.) (explaining
Eleventh Circuit found disclosure requirement did not serve state’s interest in pro-
tecting against deception and providing public with relevant information),
amended in part, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
74. See Mason, 208 F.3d at 957 (internal quotation marks omitted in first quo-
tation) (concluding Florida Bar did not meet burden of proving that Mason’s ad-
vertisement was misleading or potentially misleading).  For further information
concerning Mason, see generally Stacy Borisov, Case Comment, Commercial Speech:
Mandatory Disclaimers in the Regulation of Misleading Attorney Advertising, 12 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377 (2001) (arguing Florida Bar violated Mason’s First Amend-
ment rights).
75. 672 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012).
76. See id. at 170 (summarizing holding that certain disclaimer requirements
are unconstitutional).  The plaintiff, J. Michael Hayes, received a Board Certifica-
tion in Trial Advocacy award. See id. at 161.  Thereafter, Hayes began using the
phrase “Board Certified Civil Trial Specialist” for advertising purposes. See id. at
162 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing conduct that violated Rule 7.4
of NEW YORK’S RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT).
13
Holden: Bragging Rights Restored: The Third Circuit Allows Attorneys to Q
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR403.txt unknown Seq: 14 19-NOV-15 14:56
740 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 727
the Second Circuit did not reference the less-stringent Zauderer test for
disclosure requirements and instead applied the Central Hudson test.77
The court rejected the New York Bar’s argument that the alleged harm by
the advertisement was “self-evident.”78  Instead, the court held that the
rule failed the third prong of the Central Hudson test because the New York
Bar relied on “mere speculation or conjecture.”79
2. Circuit Court Properly Recognizes the Two Tests
In Public Citizen v. Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board,80 the Fifth Cir-
cuit analyzed two disclosure requirement rules, one concerning
“[p]ortrayal of [c]lients, [s]cenes, [and] [p]ictures” and the other con-
cerning “font size and speed of speech.”81  Unlike the Eleventh and Sec-
ond Circuits, which applied the Central Hudson test to disclosure
requirements, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s two
different tests for commercial speech regulations.82  Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit applied the Zauderer test to Louisiana’s disclosure requirements.83
The court upheld the first disclosure requirement for portrayals of clients,
scenes, and pictures because regulators provided evidence of consumer
deception.84  However, the court struck down the second disclosure re-
quirement on font size and the speed of speech because the record lacked
77. See id. at 165 (applying four-part test to regulation); see also Brief for Ap-
pellees, Hayes v. N.Y. Att’y Grievance Comm., 672 F.3d. 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-
1587-CV), 2011 WL 858609, at *24–28 (arguing rule should be analyzed under
Zauderer because that test “applies when disclaimer requirements, rather than out-
right speech prohibitions, are in issue”).
78. See Hayes, 672 F.3d at 168 (“No such demonstration is present in the re-
cord before us.  And the alleged harm is surely not self-evident.”); James T. Town-
send, Professional Responsibility, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 913 (2013) (articulating
court’s reasoning for holding rule unconstitutional).
79. See Hayes, 672 F.3d at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding
New York Rule 7.4 failed third prong of Central Hudson test); see also Peter Margu-
lies, Advocacy as a Race to the Bottom: Rethinking Limits on Lawyers’ Free Speech, 43 U.
MEM. L. REV. 319, 374–76 (2012) (providing detailed analysis of Hayes and result-
ing implications for attorney advertising).
80. 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011).
81. See id. at 227–29 (applying Zauderer to factual disclosure requirements); see
also Roy E. Pulvers, Fifth Circuit Strikes Certain Rules Governing Attorney Advertising in
Louisiana, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.martindale.com/le
gal-management/article_Hinshaw-Culbertson-LLP_1241582.htm [http://perma.
cc/SXJ4-9BQ7]  (explaining significance of opinion in that “[i]t highlights the dif-
ficulties of proof faced by the state when trying to justify stringent regulations”).
82. See Public Citizen, 632 F.3d at 227 (describing Supreme Court’s Zauderer
standard as “rational basis” review); see also Andrew C. Budzinski, Note, A Disclosure-
Focused Approach to Compelled Commercial Speech, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1318 n.82
(2014) (noting that state had two interests in Public Citizen: “preventing consumer
deception” and “promoting the ethical integrity of the legal profession” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. See Public Citizen, 632 F.3d at 219 (noting proper standard of review).
84. See id. at 227–28 (accepting evidence from survey responses that indicated
public was sometimes mislead when testimonials were provided by actors and not
actual clients).
14
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evidence of consumer deception.85  Moreover, the court held that the font
size and speed of speech requirement was unduly burdensome, reasoning
it “effectively rule[d] out the ability of Louisiana lawyers to employ short
advertisements of any kind.”86
III. PROMOTING JUDICIAL PUSHBACK: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S INVALIDATION
OF NEW JERSEY’S REGULATION IN DWYER V. CAPPELL
In the wake of recent litigation surrounding legal advertising regula-
tions, the Third Circuit is the most recent appellate court to address legal
advertising jurisprudence.87  The Third Circuit considered whether a New
Jersey guideline banning the use of excerpts or quotations from judicial
opinions was unconstitutional.88  In holding that the guideline infringed
upon the lawyer’s First Amendment rights, the Third Circuit demon-
strated judicial pushback on legal advertising regulations.89
A. Background Facts and Procedure
In 2007, Andrew Dwyer, a practicing attorney, created a website for
his law firm.90  Potential clients visiting his homepage would automatically
encounter two quotations excerpted from judicial opinions where judges
praised Dwyer’s legal abilities.91  The first excerpt quoted the remarks of
the Honorable Jose L. Fuentes, who deemed Dwyer an “exceptional” and
85. See id. at 229 (concluding evidence insufficient to demonstrate rule pre-
vented consumer deception); see also Carolyn Elefant, Lawyer Advertising: Louisiana
State Regulations and the First Amendment, MYSHINGLE (Mar. 1, 2011), http://my
shingle.com/2011/03/articles/marketing-making-money/lawyer-advertising-louisi
ana-state-regulations-and-the-first-amendment/ [http://perma.cc/R3SR-3Q7P]
(relating court’s holding to solo and small firm practitioners).
86. See Public Citizen, 632 F.3d at 229; see also Keith Swisher, Disciplinary Author-
ity and Choice of Law in Online Advertising: Disclaimers or Double Deontology, 21 PROF.
LAW., no.1, 2011, at 8, 10 n.47 (predicting that if court’s reasoning applied to “In-
ternet banner ads or Twitter” courts may find disclosure requirements unduly
burdensome).
87. See Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2014) (ruling New Jersey
guideline unconstitutional in as-applied challenge).
88. For a discussion on Dwyer’s violation under New Jersey’s Guideline 3, see
infra notes 90–104 and accompanying text.
89. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s recent application of the Zauderer
and Central Hudson test, see infra notes 105–22 and accompanying text.
90. See Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (D.N.J. 2013) (stating
Dwyer had “live website” for his law firm, The Dwyer Law Firm, L.L.C.), rev’d and
remanded, 762 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2014).
91. See id. at 671–73 (providing judicial language quoted).  Both quotes were
from unpublished opinions about employment discrimination cases under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, specifically addressing fee applications. See
id. at 671 (describing source of quotations).  In fee application proceedings, a pre-
vailing party may apply to have the other side pay for attorney fees. See Samuel J.
Samaro, Dwyer v. Cappell: No More Judicial PDAs, PAST MIDDLE (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://pastthemiddle.com/2014/08/15/dwyer-v-cappell-no-more-judicial-pdas/
[http://perma.cc/3P4T-3A89].  In such cases, the judge is required to evaluate the
quality and abilities of the prevailing party’s lawyer. See id.  Therefore, both quota-
15
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“passionate” attorney.92  The second quotation relayed the sentiments of
Judge William L. Wertheimer:
The inescapable conclusion is . . . that plaintiffs achieved a spec-
tacular result when the file was in the hands of Mr. Dwyer. . . .
Mr. Dwyer was a fierce, if sometimes not disinterested advocate
for his clients, and through an offensive and defensive motion
practice and through other discovery methods molded the case
to the point where it could be successfully resolved.93
Dissatisfied about being quoted on Dwyer’s homepage, Judge Wert-
heimer sent Dwyer a letter in 2008 requesting that the quote attached to
his name be removed.94  In his letter, Judge Wertheimer explained his
unease that potential clients may interpret the quote as a judicial endorse-
ment.95  Dwyer, however, refused to take down the quote, stating that it
was not “false or misleading.”96
Both letters were forwarded to the New Jersey Bar’s Committee on
Attorney Advertising (the Committee).97 In response, the Committee en-
acted Guideline 3: a new attorney-advertising rule.98  Under Guideline 3,
lawyers were banned from advertising with quotes from judicial opinions
but were allowed to include the full text of the opinion.99
tions used on Dwyer’s website were from opinions where the judges, by statute, had
to comment on Dwyer’s abilities. See id.
92. See Dwyer, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 671–72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. See id. at 672.
95. See Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2014) (stressing Judge
Wertheimer’s concern that remarks would be interpreted as “a blanket endorse-
ment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
According to the New Jersey State Bar Association, judges are not allowed to
endorse lawyers. See Christine S. Filip, Esq., Carol Johnston, Esq. & Raymond M.
Brown, Esq., Presentation at the New Jersey Bar Association Annual Meeting and
Convention: Marketing and Ethics 2014: Maximizing Results While Avoiding Lia-
bility (May 15, 2014) (“Mostly a problem for the judge under judicial ethics ca-
nons, judges cannot endorse lawyers and being friend [sic] on a professional
oriented website is close to an endorsement.”).
96. See Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 277 (noting Dwyer’s refusal to adhere to Judge Wert-
heimer’s request).
97. See id. (explaining how Committee became involved in dispute).  The
Committee is appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court and has “exclusive au-
thority to consider requests for advisory opinions and ethics grievances concerning
the compliance of advertisements and other related communications . . . .” See N.J.
CT. R. 1:19A, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/r1-19a.htm [http:/
/perma.cc/RM8Y-W69L] (explaining appointment and organization of
committee).
98. See Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 277 (describing New Jersey’s reaction to disagree-
ment between Dwyer and Judge Wertheimer).
99. See id. at 277–78 (tracing Committee’s enactment of Guideline 3).  The
Committee created a proposed attorney-advertising guideline in 2009 that
“banned [lawyers from] advertising with quotes from judges or judicial opinions”
and thereafter published a Notice to the Bar seeking comments on the proposed
guideline. See id. at 277.  The New Jersey Supreme Court amended the proposed
16
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“The day before Guideline 3 went into effect, Dwyer filed [an] action”
challenging the constitutionality of the new regulation.100  The district
court held Guideline 3 was a valid disclosure requirement under
Zauderer.101  Concluding Guideline 3 was a disclosure regulation, the dis-
trict court explained that “[i]t allows publication of all the content sought
to be published within a judicial quotation, albeit within its full con-
text.”102  Additionally, the district court reasoned, “[a] judicial quotation’s
potential to mislead a consumer is self-evident.”103  Dissatisfied with the
district court’s ruling, Dwyer appealed to the Third Circuit.104
B. The Third Circuit’s Analysis
The Third Circuit held that Guideline 3 violated Dwyer’s First
Amendment rights by requiring him to include the entire judicial opinion
on his firm’s webpage.105  The court acknowledged the two possible
frameworks applicable to legal advertising regulations: the Central Hudson
guideline, and it was approved in May 2012.  The proposed Guideline, known as
Guideline 3, read as follows:
An attorney or law firm may not include, on a website or other advertise-
ment, a quotation or excerpt from a court opinion (oral or written)
about the attorney’s abilities or legal services.  An attorney may, however,
present the full text of opinions, including those that discuss the attor-
ney’s legal abilities, on a website or other advertisement.
Id. at 278.  The Comment created to accompany the final version of Guideline 3
indicated that this guideline was enacted to directly target Dwyer’s law firm web-
site. See id.
100. See id. (stating Dwyer filed action “in the District Court of New Jersey
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
101. See Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 674–75 (D.N.J. 2013), rev’d and
remanded, 762 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Dane S. Ciolino, A Judge’s Kind Words
About a Lawyer Can’t be Quoted Out of Context, LA. LEGAL ETHICS (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://lalegalethics.org/judges-kind-words-lawyer-cant-quoted-context/ [http://
perma.cc/P7Y3-FLPG] (advising Louisiana lawyers to avoid using judicial quota-
tions in light of New Jersey district court’s ruling); Donald Scarinci, New Jersey Law-
yers Can’t Use Judicial Testimonials in Ads, NJ.COM (Nov. 14, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://
blog.nj.com/njv_donald_scarinci/2013/11/new_jersey_lawyers_cant_use_ju.html
[http://perma.cc/B7WF-ATL5] (summarizing district court’s reasoning).
102. See Dwyer, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 674 (declining to rule guideline was ban on
speech); see also Joseph A. Corsmeier, New Jersey Federal District Court States That Law-
yers May Not Post Excerpts from Judicial Opinions Complimenting the Quality [sic] the Law-
yers’ Work on Their Websites, LAW. ETHICS ALERT BLOGS (Nov. 14, 2013, 1:18 PM),
https://jcorsmeier.wordpress.com/2013/11/14/new-jersey-federal-district-court-
states-that-lawyers-may-not-post-excerpts-from-judicial-opinions-complimenting-the-
quality-the-lawyers-work-on-their-websites/ [https://perma.cc/V5YU-JHF9] (argu-
ing district court “seems to stretch meaning of disclosure” requirement (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
103. See Dwyer, 951 F. Supp. at 674–75 (reasoning quotes could “easily be mis-
construed as improper judicial endorsement”).
104. See Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 279 (stating procedural history).
105. See id. at 282 (“Yet we need not decide whether it is a restriction on
speech or a disclosure requirement.  This is because the Guideline is . . . . unconsti-
tutional under even the less-stringent Zauderer standard of scrutiny.”).
17
Holden: Bragging Rights Restored: The Third Circuit Allows Attorneys to Q
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR403.txt unknown Seq: 18 19-NOV-15 14:56
744 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 727
test for restrictions and the Zauderer test for disclosures.106  The Third Cir-
cuit, however, refrained from deciding which test was the appropriate
analysis and remarked that Guideline 3 contained characteristics from
both categories.107  Instead, the court held Guideline 3 infringed upon
attorneys’ First Amendment free speech rights because “the Guideline
[wa]s not reasonably related to preventing consumer deception and [wa]s
unduly burdensome.”108
1. Not Reasonably Related to Preventing Consumer Deception
Assessing Guideline 3 under the Zauderer analysis, the Third Circuit
first addressed the Committee’s argument that the judicial statements on
Dwyer’s homepage were inherently misleading.109  The Committee rea-
soned that a nonprofessional would interpret these excerpts as judicial en-
dorsements.110  In a footnote, the Third Circuit stated that the Committee
did not produce any evidence that Dwyer’s quotes had actually misled con-
sumers.111  Moreover, the Third Circuit refused to find that accurate state-
ments made by judges qualified as obvious deception.112
Furthermore, even if the excerpts could conceivably mislead consum-
ers, the Third Circuit noted that the Committee failed to explain how a
complete judicial opinion was an appropriate remedy.113  The court ex-
pressed doubt that providing a full judicial opinion would reveal to a po-
tential client that such language was not a judicial endorsement.114
Alternatively, the court reasoned that this requirement could potentially
create further confusion.115  The Third Circuit suggested that a reasona-
106. See id. at 279–82 (tracing Supreme Court’s treatment of disclosure re-
quirements and restriction regulations).
107. See id. at 282 (noting Guideline 3 may be disclosure requirement or re-
striction requirement).
108. See id. (providing court’s holding).
109. See id. (discussing Committee’s argument that Dwyer’s quotes will mis-
lead potential clients); Brief in Opposition to the Appeal on Behalf of Defendants-
Appellees at 7, Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-3235), 2013
WL 5797511, at *7–8 (“When a judge discusses an attorney’s legal abilities in an
opinion, such as in a fee-shifting or division-of-fee case, the judge is setting forth
findings of fact and conclusions of law pertinent to the decision in the matter.
The judge is not personally endorsing the attorney . . . .” (quoting N.J. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT 7.1(a) cmt.)).
110. See Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 282 (“The Committee hyperbolizes that the ex-
cerpts prohibited by Guideline 3 are inherently misleading because laypersons
reading such quotes would understand them to be judicial endorsements.”).
111. See id. at 282–83 n.5 (assessing whether Dwyer’s use of judicial quotes was
potentially misleading).
112. See id. at 283 n.5 (“[T]he deceptiveness of accurately transcribed state-
ments made by judges in judicial opinion excerpts is far from ‘self-evident.’”).
113. See id. at 282–83 (scrutinizing ability of full judicial opinion to prevent
consumer deception).
114. See id. at 282 (reasoning guideline was not proper remedy for alleged
deception).
115. See id. at 283–84 (commenting on impracticality of Guideline 3).
18
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ble disclosure requirement might be: “ ‘This is an excerpt of a judicial
opinion from a specific legal dispute. It is not an endorsement of my
abilities.’”116
2. Unduly Burdensome
The Third Circuit also held Guideline 3 was unduly burdensome,
meaning the “required disclosure [wa]s so lengthy it ‘effectively rule[d]
out’ advertising by the desired means.”117  Citing the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Public Citizen, where the court held that a lengthy attorney disclo-
sure requirement for television advertisements was unduly burdensome,
the Third Circuit determined that Guideline 3 was even more burden-
some than the disclosure requirement stricken down in that case.118  The
court explained, “providing a full-text judicial opinion is so cumbersome
that it effectively nullifies the advertisement.”119
In its final remarks, the Third Circuit stated that because Guideline 3
was particularly unduly burdensome, the Committee might have intended
an outright ban on the use of judicial excerpts in advertising.120  If so, the
proper analysis for Guideline 3 would shift from Zauderer’s less stringent
analysis to Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny.121  Because it had failed
the Zauderer test, the Third Circuit reasoned Guideline 3 would also not
withstand Central Hudson scrutiny.122
IV. KNOWING YOUR TARGET AUDIENCE: LEGAL ADVERTISING IN THE THIRD
CIRCUIT AFTER DWYER
In light of the Third Circuit’s decision in Dwyer, the legal community
experienced both a victory and a loss.123  In one respect, due to the self-
116. See id. at 283 (suggesting alternative disclosure requirement that would
properly inform potential clients that judicial quotation is not judicial
endorsements).
117. Id. (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S.
136, 146 (1994)).
118. See id. at 284 (explaining lawyers would only be able to adhere to guide-
line via internet webpages because providing entire judicial opinion in other medi-
ums is impractical).
119. Id.
120. See id. (“While the intention behind Guideline 3 may be to make it so
burdensome to quote judicial opinions that attorneys will cease doing so, that type
of restriction—an outright ban on advertising with judicial excerpts—would prop-
erly be analyzed under the heightened Central Hudson standard of scrutiny.”).
121. See id. (discussing proper analysis if Guideline 3 is considered restriction
requirement).
122. See id. (“Although such a ban would fail as applied to Dwyer given our
holding under the less stringent Zauderer standard, we need not decide whether
such a ban would be valid in other cases.”).
123. See Joseph A. Corsmeier, U.S. Third Circuit Appeals Court Rejects New Jersey’s
Prohibition of Lawyer’s Website Posts of Excerpts of Judicial Opinions Praising His Legal
Work, LAW. ETHICS ALERT BLOGS (Feb. 2, 2015, 4:11 PM), https://jcorsmeier.word
press.com/2015/02/02/u-s-third-circuit-appeals-court-rejects-new-jerseys-prohibi-
19
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regulated nature of the legal system, those attempting to restrict legal ad-
vertising will now face constitutional challenges under a heightened level
of review.124  In another respect, the Third Circuit expanded protection
for legal advertising.125
A. Advice for Practitioners Regulating Legal Advertising
For practitioners regulating legal advertising, the Third Circuit’s
holding in Dwyer creates new difficulties when faced with constitutional
challenges.126  The Third Circuit declined to resolve whether Guideline 3
was a restriction regulation or a disclosure requirement, thus leaving out
the appropriate level of scrutiny.127  As a result, many regulators are left
with uncertainty because they can no longer predict whether disclosure
requirements will receive Zauderer’s less stringent standard of review or
whether courts will impose Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny.128
However, even if a court does apply the Zauderer analysis, regulators
should be cautious when articulating restrictions on attorney speech.129
As a First Amendment scholar stated: “[W]e are in the midst of a move-
ment away from this ‘free pass’ assumption, as courts seem increasingly
[willing] to apply [the] Zauderer review with more rigor.”130  The Third
Circuit, along with other circuit courts, is giving less deference to regula-
tors by requiring hard evidence to defend legal advertising regulations.131
tion-of-lawyers-website-posts-of-excerpts-of-judicial-opinions-praising-his-legal-
work/ [https://perma.cc/S52U-SSRR] (labeling Dwyer decision “a significant First
Amendment decision related to lawyer advertising”).
124. For a discussion of Dwyer’s impact on legal advertising regulators, see
infra notes 126–41 and accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of Dwyer’s impact on practitioners who advertise their
services, see infra notes 142–54 and accompanying text.
126. See LESLIE A.T. HALEY WITH THOMAS E. SPAHN, LAWYER COMMUNICATIONS
AND MARKETING: AN ETHICS PRIMER, HYPOTHETICALS AND ANALYSES 10 (2014), avail-
able at http://63.247.140.129/~vbbarassoc/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Lawyer-
Marketing_An-Ethics-Primer-H-A-Spahn.pdf [http://perma.cc/5DHK-TYXL] (“In
what might be a trend, a number of courts in the last few years have invalidated as
unconstitutional portions of states’ ethics rules.”).
127. See Gabriella Khorasanee, Lawyer Wins 1st Amendment Claim in Attorney
Advertising Case, FINDLAW (Aug. 13, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/
third_circuit/2014/08/lawyer-wins-1st-amendment-claim-in-attorney-advertising-
case.html [http://perma.cc/T6GX-5QNS] (discussing how Third Circuit did not
decide whether Guideline 3 was disclosure or prohibition).
128. See Royal, supra note 47 (providing standard and protections for speech
restrictions and describing factual disclosure requirements).
129. E-mail Interview with Rodney A. Smolla, First Amendment Scholar &
Professor, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law (Feb. 1, 2015) (on file with author) (discussing
Third Circuit’s current approach to Zauderer).  According to Professor Smolla,
“[Dwyer] is important in the court’s chiding bar authorities on their lack of any
proof that the quotes were misleading, and seeming to warn that it won’t accept
the phrase ‘inherently misleading’ as an automatic pass for bar authorities.” See id.
130. See id. (commenting on recent application of Zauderer test).
131. See Ruthann Robson, Third Circuit: Attorney Advertising Rule Regarding Ex-
cerpts from Judicial Opinions Violates First Amendment, CONST. L. PROFESSORS BLOG
20
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The Third Circuit demonstrated this resistance by dismissing the Commit-
tee’s claims that Dwyer’s quotes were “inherently misleading” and that de-
ception was “self-evident.”132  Accordingly, practitioners seeking to
implement disclosure regulations will increase their chances of with-
standing constitutional challenges if they are able to demonstrate, with a
strong supporting record, the regulation corrects potentially misleading
speech.133  A strong record may be comprised of statistics, surveys, or fo-
cus group results that support the finding that a certain advertising tech-
nique is potentially misleading.134
In addition to establishing that a regulation is aimed at potentially
misleading speech, regulators must also show that the actual regulation
corrects the proven deception.135  In Dwyer, the court stated that the Com-
mittee failed to establish how including an entire judicial opinion instead
of just an excerpt would decrease a layperson’s likelihood of perceiving
the advertisement as a judicial endorsement.136  Under this framework,
practitioners will need to prove there is a closer nexus between the alleged
deception and the proposed remedy in order to withstand the more de-
manding Zauderer review.137
Moreover, the Third Circuit presented new concerns for regulators
with its unduly burdensome analysis.138  Although other courts have
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2014/08/third-circuit
-attorney-advertising-rule-regarding-excerpts-from-judicial-opinions-violates-first-
ame.html [http://perma.cc/6UL3-2MK8] (emphasizing decision aligns with First
Amendment rights on speech protection).
132. See Charles Toutant, Third Circuit Oks Judges’ Accolades in Attorneys’ Ads,
N.J. L.J. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202666491263/Third-
Circuit-OKs-Judges-Accolades-in-Attorneys-Ads [http://perma.cc/4W4L-T5C3]
(noting Third Circuit decision is consistent with Second, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits).
133. See Hudson, supra note 1 (stating record did not contain “a shred of
evidence” that guideline protected against consumer deception (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
134. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212,
224–25 (5th Cir. 2011) (deeming surveys and comments from focus groups suffi-
cient evidence).
135. See Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Guideline 3 does
not require disclosing anything that could reasonably remedy conceivable con-
sumer deception stemming from Dwyer’s advertisement.  Providing a full judicial
opinion does not reveal to a potential client that an excerpt of the same opinion is
not an endorsement.”).
136. See id. (explaining impracticability of requiring attorneys to display en-
tire judicial opinion).
137. See Michael Heatherly, Dwyer v. Cappell: Court Upholds Lawyer’s Right to
Quote Judges’ Praise in Website Advertising, NWSIDEBAR (Jan. 14, 2015), http://nwside
bar.wsba.org/2015/01/14/dwyer-cappell-web-advertising/ [http://perma.cc/D9
JF-Z3TS] (stating rule does “not require disclosure of anything that would dispel
confusion”).
138. See David L. Hudson Jr., Attorney Can Quote Judicial Opinions in Advertising,
NEWSEUM INST. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/attorney-can-
quote-judicial-opinions-in-advertising/ [http://perma.cc/NV2H-QPEA] (com-
menting that court found Guideline 3 unduly burdensome).
21
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found disclosure requirements unduly burdensome, the Third Circuit ex-
plained that such a requirement could potentially shift the regulation
from a Zauderer analysis to a Central Hudson analysis if the purpose of the
regulation was to ban a form of advertising.139  To avoid being subject to
Central Hudson’s heightened scrutiny, regulators should limit the extent of
disclosure requirements necessary to correct the potentially misleading
speech.140  Yet, due to the Third Circuit’s more rigorous scrutiny under
Zauderer, even a disclosure-requirement analysis is no longer an easy vic-
tory for regulators.141
B. Advice for Practitioners Seeking to Advertise
The Third Circuit’s analysis in Dwyer allows practitioners who adver-
tise to take comfort in one assurance provided by the court’s recent deci-
sion: now, advertising regulations may no longer be imposed
haphazardly.142  By rejecting the Committee’s unfounded claims that An-
drew Dwyer’s use of judicial quotes was misleading, the circuit court af-
firmed that legal advertising regulations must be strictly confined to
correct advertising with a substantiated misleading effect.143  Therefore,
practitioners within the Third Circuit who wish to challenge overreaching
advertising regulations can now use regulators’ lack of supportive evidence
as an effective tool for invalidation.144
Additionally, in the aftermath of Dwyer, some practitioners plan to re-
store judicial quotations to their law firm websites.145  In fact, Dwyer him-
139. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Dwyer v. Cappell—Third Circuit, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Aug. 12, 2014, 2:01 PM), http://apps.americanbar.org/ababoards/blog/blogpost
.cfm?threadid=31007&catid=14911 [http://perma.cc/YTR9-U86T] (discussing
Third Circuit’s analysis that disclosure requirements may be subject to Central Hud-
son based on court’s intent of Guideline).
140. See E-mail Interview with Rodney A. Smolla, supra note 129 (stating court
holding Guideline was unduly burdensome was important aspect of decision).
141. See generally Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 589 (2012)
(discussing confusion among lower courts about the scope of Zauderer).
142. See E-mail Interview with Josh King, Vice President, Bus. Dev. & Gen.
Counsel, Avvo, Inc. (Jan. 26, 2015) (on record with author) (“The key takeaway is
that regulators can’t simply say ‘this disclosure is necessary to prevent the potential
for an advertising message to be misleading’ and expect to get away with it.”).
143. See Toutant, supra note 132 (highlighting Committee’s lack of evidence
to support claims).
144. See E-mail Interview with Rodney A. Smolla, supra note 129 (explaining
courts are showing resistance to “inherently misleading” arguments and are requir-
ing proof (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145. See Mary Pat Gallagher, Revised Guideline Allows Judges’ Quotes in Lawyer
Ads, N.J. L.J. (Oct. 17, 2014) [hereinafter M.P. Gallagher], http://www.njlawjour-
nal.com/id=1202673775912/Revised-Guideline-Allows-Judges-Quotes-in-Lawyer-
Ads?slreturn=20150031204602 [http://perma.cc/L4JU-FY8U] (discussing practi-
tioners who plan to use judicial quotations on website to attract potential clients).
But see Peter J. Gallagher, “Judges Think I Am Awesome!” Third Circuit Approves Use of
Judicial Endorsement on Lawyer’s Website, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (Oct. 16,
2014, 11:05 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/constitution/b/con-
22
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self plans to repost the complimentary quotes that were once displayed on
his homepage.146  However, practitioners who intend to employ this ad-
vertising technique need to be aware of the New Jersey Committee’s re-
cent changes in light of the Third Circuit’s decision.147  On October 15,
2014, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved a new version of Guideline
3, effective immediately.148  This revised version requires lawyers to in-
clude a disclaimer with quotations or excerpts from judicial opinions.149
In accordance with the Third Circuit’s recommendation from Dwyer, the
disclaimer must state, “This comment, made by a judge in a particular
case, is not an endorsement of my legal skill or ability.”150
Other jurisdictions falling within the Third Circuit have not imple-
mented regulations of this kind.151  In fact, the Pennsylvania Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated, “Pennsylvania does
not have a provision comparable to Guideline 3, so the decision does not
directly affect Pennsylvania lawyers.  The Third Circuit’s opinion is a use-
stitutional-civil-rights/archive/2014/10/16/quot-judges-think-i-am-awesome-quot-
third-circuit-approves-use-of-judicial-endorsement-on-lawyer-39-s-website.aspx
[http://perma.cc/SSE6-RELR] (suggesting that using judicial quotes with dis-
claimer may not be effective for advertising).
146. See M.P. Gallagher, supra note 145 (“Dwyer stated on Oct. 17 that the
revised guideline makes it clear the [sic] he can use the quotes, and he plans to
restore them in the coming month.”).
147. See George Conk, New Jersey Supreme Court Compels Disclaimer by Lawyers
Citing Judges’ Praise, BLACKSTONETODAY.BLOGSPOT.COM (Oct. 17, 2014), http://
blackstonetoday.blogspot.com/2014/10/new-jersey-supreme-court-compels.html
[http://perma.cc/HJ6H-9J6M] (warning lawyers who want to advertise with
quotes by judges must now include disclaimer).
148. See GLENN A. GRANT, ADMIN. OFFICE OF N.J. COURTS, NOTICE TO THE BAR:
REVISED ATTORNEY ADVERTISING GUIDELINE 3 (Oct. 15, 2014), available at http://
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2014/n141015c.pdf [http://perma.cc/GW4H-
GL6D] (providing text to new revised guideline).
An attorney or law firm may include, on a website or other advertisement,
an accurate quotation or excerpt from a court opinion (oral or written)
about the attorney’s abilities or legal services.  The following disclaimer
must be prominently displayed in proximity to such quotation or excerpt:
“This comment, made by a judge in a particular case, is not an endorse-
ment of my legal skill or ability.”
Id.
149. See id. (explaining that lawyers should include disclaimer requirement
with commentary judicial quotations used for advertising).
150. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing language that at-
torney should include on legal advertisements that contain court opinion ex-
cerpts); see also Bruce D. Greenberg, Supreme Court Guideline Barring Lawyers from
Posting Accurate Quotes from Judges on Law Firm Websites Is Invalid, N.J. APP. L. (Aug.
15, 2014), http://appellatelaw-nj.com/supreme-court-guideline-barring-lawyers-
from-posting-accurate-quotes-from-judges-on-law-firm-websites-is-invalid/ [http://
perma.cc/3YUF-ULPS] (predicting this new guideline could also be challenged in
court on constitutional grounds).
151. See E. Regine Francois, A Judicial Endorsement?, DAILY REC. (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://thedailyrecord.com/2015/02/04/a-judicial-endorsement/ [http://perma.
cc/62KG-SGXT] (suggesting issue “not unique to New Jersey” and “likely will make
its way to other jurisdictions”).
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ful refresher on First Amendment issues relating to lawyer advertising,
however.”152
Still, lawyers who practice in Third Circuit jurisdictions outside of
New Jersey should use caution when displaying quotations or excerpts
without a disclaimer.153  Advertising a simple complimentary quotation
may cause further unrest among state regulators, and the use of such quo-
tations may also stifle judges from giving complimentary remarks, fearing
a lawyer may later exploit their language for commercial purposes.154
V. CONCLUSION
The court’s ruling in Dwyer has made it clear that the Third Circuit is
restricting legal advertising regulators’ reach by applying a rigorous level
of scrutiny.155  While Dwyer aligns with recent circuit court decisions, the
Third Circuit’s analysis has gained recognition in the legal community.156
As one commentator stated, “Dwyer is important because it finally gives
judicial pushback to an example of sweeping governmental overreach and
suggests there is a boundary beyond which Zauderer cannot be
stretched.”157
152. See Attorney E-Newsletter: Third Circuit Strikes Down New Jersey Prohibition on
Advertising Judicial Praise, DISCIPLINARY BD. SUP. CT. PA. (Aug. 2014), http://www.
padisciplinaryboard.org/attorneys/newsletter/2014/august.php [http://perma.
cc/LWR4-K7AT] (explaining Dwyer’s impact on Pennsylvania).
153. See Samaro, supra note 91 (asserting that use of judicial quotations is “a
quick way to irritate a judge” and may embarrass judges).
154. See Third Circuit Got It Wrong on Lawyer Advertising, N.J. L.J. (Sept. 26,
2014), http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202671540728/Third-Circuit-Got-it-
Wrong-on-Lawyer-Advertising?slreturn=20141123201906 [http://perma.cc/S5HZ-
DG8L] (expressing concern that judges may be “chilled in their compliments of
and comments about lawyers” if such remarks are used for advertising purposes);
see also David L. Hudson Jr., Federal District Court Cautions Lawyers to Be Careful About
Repeating Judges’ Compliments, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/federal_district_court_cautions_lawyers_to_be_careful_about_
repeating_judge/ [http://perma.cc/24Q3-L9LJ] (noting practitioners using judi-
cial experts for advertising could threaten integrity of legal field).
155. See E-mail Interview with Rodney A. Smolla, supra note 129 (explaining
court was “chiding bar authorities on their lack of any proof that the quotes were
misleading”).
156. See Attorney Advertisement Guideline Requiring Full Judicial Opinions Unconsti-
tutional: Third Circuit, PRAC. L. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/6-578-
0325 [http://perma.cc/QBC4-M829] (discussing Third Circuit’s analysis and
holding in Dwyer); Allison C. Shields, Advertising Rules in Conflict with First Amend-
ment, LEGAL EASE BLOG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://legalease.blogs.com/legal_ease_
blog/2014/08/advertising-rules-in-conflict-with-first-amendment.html [http://
perma.cc/CP5D-FUBZ] (same).  An attorney from Washington even suggested
that similar facts in a Washington court may “boil down to similar issues as those
addressed in Dwyer v. Cappell.” See Heatherly, supra note 137, (considering applica-
tion of Dwyer in future litigation).
157. See Hudson, supra note 1 (quoting Rodney A. Smolla, First Amendment
Scholar) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Although the New Jersey Committee reacted to Dwyer by imposing a
new disclaimer requirement for judicial quotes, this new rule could possi-
bly fail a constitutional challenge under the Third Circuit’s application of
Zauderer.158  In light of the court’s rationale in Dwyer, regulators will need
to provide supportive evidence to withstand judicial pushback.159  While it
is still too early to see the full effect of the Third Circuit’s holding, the
Third Circuit is expanding a practitioner’s right to advertise beyond the
confines of the pre-Bates era.160
158. See Greenberg, supra note 150 (predicting future challenge to disclaimer
requirement for judicial excerpts). But see Corsmeier, supra note 123 (stating
Dwyer decision approved of use of disclaimer).
159. See Hudson, supra note 1 (discussing “judicial hostility” towards over-
reaching regulations (internal quotation marks omitted)).
160. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Restriction on Judicial Quotes in Lawyer Ads Violates
First Amendment, 3rd Circuit Rules, ABA J. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.
abajournal.com/mobile/article/restriction_on_judicial_quotes_in_lawyer_ads_vio
lates_first_amendment_3rd_c [http://perma.cc/FW37-NBGT] (denoting that
Dwyer believes opinion will be very influential because “a lot of the regulations of
attorney advertising in New Jersey are antiquated and somewhat unconstitutional”
(quoting Andrew Dwyer) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Stephen
Fairley, Federal Appeals Court Rules Attorneys Have Right to Publish Praise from Judges,
RAINMAKER BLOG (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.therainmakerblog.com/2014/08/
articles/law-firm-marketing/federal-appeals-court-rules-attorneys-have-right-to-
publish-praise-from-judges/ [http://perma.cc/GFL8-P28J] (suggesting Dwyer
“could have farther-reaching effects in terms of how attorneys use testimonials in
their advertising”).
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